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1 Introduction
Notwithstanding a long history of authoritarian
governance and instability created by more than a
decade of violent conflict, West Africa has shifted
its security focus from state security to include
human security concerns. This shift comprises
three relevant elements. First, the state is no
longer the primary focus of security in the
subregion. It has been difficult to ignore the root
causes of major armed conflict since 1990, which
demonstrate that the security of the state is
underpinned by the security of its peoples. Second,
the state is no longer the sole security actor or
contributor to security decision-making processes.
Rather, non-state security actors are more
prominent with civil society playing an active role.
Third and crucially, this pattern of active civil
society involvement in security processes has been
more noticeable at the subregional level than at
the national level. This has been particularly
visible in the interaction between the Commission
of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and civil society groups.
This article examines why and how the West
African subregion has evolved a security
framework that encompasses human security, not
just state security, and includes civil society groups
in regional security decision-making. It focuses
mainly on the interaction between ECOWAS and
West African civil society in the field of peace and
security,1 arguing that the transformation in civil
society engagement with ECOWAS from an ad hoc
to a more institutionalised interaction has been a
mutually strengthening process.
2 ECOWAS’s security thinking since the end of
the Cold War
ECOWAS, which was founded in 1975 for
reasons of economic integration, radically
changed course when it became saddled with the
Liberian civil war in 1990 and later with the war
in Sierra Leone in March 1991. Although these
conflicts were not the first times that ECOWAS
paid attention to security issues in the region,
they presented a distinctly different set of
security challenges.2 For much of the period
between its inception in 1975 until 1990,
ECOWAS viewed security only in terms of
threats to the state. Typically, security crises
occurring within the boundaries of a member
state were deemed to be the domestic
jurisdiction of that state. Thus, at the outbreak
of the Liberian civil war in December 1989, there
was not any expectation of a regional response.
The Liberian conflict was the first to reveal the
scale of governance deficits in African states.
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West Africa was home to many authoritarian
regimes, which were shored up by superpower
allies during the Cold War and could no longer
count on that support in a new dispensation.
With new conditionality for external support
(e.g. democracy and good governance), opposition
groups and citizens were, for the first time in
decades, able to demand accountability from
their rulers. Some governments heeded the call,
thus averting an escalation to violent conflict (in
Mali and Benin). Others (Liberia) did not seem
to understand the realities of the time, which
resulted in the escalation of conflict and a
challenge to the regime through armed force.
The governance crisis in Liberia was common to
many countries in the region. This proved to be
the case in Sierra Leone, where the types of
structural factors that led to the collapse of the
Liberian state were also present; Guinea-Bissau
and Côte d’Ivoire saw outbreaks of violent
conflict in 1998 and 2002, respectively. It was
clear that the nature and conduct of the
conflicts, which were internal in origin but
regional in their impact, were more intense than
at any time in post-independence Africa.
Civilians were the focus of violence, and many
victims themselves ended up becoming
perpetrators of violence and atrocities.
ECOWAS responded to these challenges
incrementally. First, it maintained a semblance of
order in the war-ravaged countries with its
Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG
(Olonisakin 2003). The intractable nature of the
conflicts and their devastating regional impact
later emphasised the need to explore factors at
the root of armed conflict. ECOWAS sought to
strengthen its normative framework in the field
of peace and security. In 1993, ECOWAS revised
its Treaty, signalling a departure from implicit
endorsement of authoritarian rule. The revised
Treaty emphasised democracy and the rule of law
as a new framework within which the economic
integration and development agenda would be
pursued (ECOWAS 1993). This was followed in
1999 by the adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol
relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security, commonly referred to
as the ‘Mechanism’, which now forms the core of
the ECOWAS peace and security architecture.
The Mechanism emphasised early warning and
mediation, peacebuilding, as well as
peacekeeping (ECOWAS 1999), and its provisions
resulted in the restructuring of the ECOWAS
Secretariat (now ECOWAS Commission).
The Mechanism moved ECOWAS from its earlier
ad hoc approach to collective security to a
coherent and institutionalised framework for
security cooperation in the subregion. In 2001,
ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Democracy
and Good Governance, which supplemented the
Mechanism and introduced peacebuilding as part
of the effort to prevent further violent conflict
and achieve stability in West Africa (ECOWAS
2001). In January 2008, ECOWAS adopted the
Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which
consolidates existing frameworks for conflict
prevention and management and outlines a plan
for addressing the structural causes of conflict.
ECOWAS’ experience of norm development in
the area of peace and security was driven by the
nature and impact of the armed conflicts in the
subregion. The organisation is considered
perhaps the most progressive in Africa from
which its subregional counterparts, and indeed
the African Union, have much to learn. However,
this success in norm setting should also be
viewed within the context of a major shift in
position by the continental organisation.
ECOWAS led the way in departing from strict
adherence to the principles of non-interference
in internal affairs of member states, particularly
in situations of humanitarian tragedy. The
Organisation of African Unity (now the African
Union) later adopted a framework for addressing
unconstitutional changes of government
(Olonisakin 2007).
3 Evolution of a civil society movement on peace
and security
A civil society movement in the field of peace and
security is still evolving in West Africa. Civil
society involvement in this field was neither
prominent nor widespread in the subregion prior
to 1990 amid the prevailing atmosphere of
authoritarian governance. Discussion of security
issues was the preserve of a chosen few, not least
members of the security establishment. However,
a new era, particularly one dominated by
widespread violent intra-state conflict, has
impacted West Africa’s civilian population both
negatively and positively. West African citizens
have been the focus of violence but there are also
increased opportunities for citizens to voice their
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demands for more open governance. Civil society
is increasingly involved in the development of
solutions to the security challenges that have
impacted citizens’ day-to-day existence.
Prominent security issues in civil society activism
in West Africa include, for example, the impact
of armed groups against civilian populations; the
use, abuse and exploitation of children and
women in situations of armed conflict;
proliferation of small arms and light weapons
and the role of security forces in citizens’ lives.
Civil society’s focus on these issues is hardly
surprising, given their centrality during the
region’s most devastating civil conflicts and
authoritarian rule. In countries like Nigeria that
did not experience the type of armed conflict in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, the security
establishment maintained a stranglehold on
citizens’ daily lives with various human rights
violations. This inspired effective civil society
campaigns against military rule in the 1990s
until the sudden death of General Sanni Abacha
in 1998 ended 15 years of military dictatorship.
Similarly, Gambia has been under military
authoritarian rule for the past 14 years, with
rising incidents of human rights violations
(Amnesty International 2008).
During the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Côte d’Ivoire and, to a lesser degree, Guinea-
Bissau, civilians became both victims and
perpetrators. Children became weapons of war in
ways that had not been previously seen in West
Africa. The single highest incidence of childhood
abduction occurred in Sierra Leone in January
1999 with the kidnapping of approximately 4,000
children by rebel forces during their invasion of
Freetown. Similarly, forcing women to fight or
subjecting them to rape as sexual slaves were
common, particularly in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Such instances have compelled civil society to
prevent similar recurrences of civil conflict.
Over time, West African civil society has
developed various activities such as awareness
campaigns, advocacy, policy and programmatic
interventions. In different national contexts, civil
society has provided the active, responsive voice
to the security challenges impacting the daily
lives of citizens. This advocacy has brought these
issues to the global and regional security agenda,
thus shifting the focus from traditional state
security concerns.
A number of local civil society organisations and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were
founded to respond to some of these security
concerns. These include, for example, Campaign
for Good Governance (CGG) in Sierra Leone,
Centre for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE),
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, and
Foundation for International Integrity (FIND) in
Liberia; Foundation for Security and
Development in Africa (FOSDA), African
Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), and
West African Network for Peacebuilding
(WANEP) in Ghana; African Strategic and Peace
Research Group (AFSTRAG), Centre for
Democracy and Development (CDD) and
CLEEN Foundation in Nigeria; RADHO in
Senegal; the Mano River Women’s Peace
Network (MARWOPNET) in Guinea, Liberia
and Sierra Leone; and the African Security
Sector Network (ASSN), which extends beyond
West Africa to the whole continent.
While individual citizens and local civil society
groups are often at the frontline in responding to
security issues, these issues have not
automatically captured attention at the regional
or global level. Other actors have provided the
leverage to transform the issues and provide
heightened visibility on a global stage.
International media has drawn significant
attention to some of the most egregious violations
of human rights including amputation of limbs,
sexual exploitation and child soldiering. However,
other actors, for example scholars and analysts in
Africa and the Diaspora, international NGOs,
international organisations and donor agencies
have played a crucial role in up-scaling the work of
local civil society actors. In addition, a number of
regional policy decisions and processes such as the
New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) and the ECOWAS Moratorium on small
arms provided opportunities for civil society action
and engagement.
Activist and advocacy work in different West
African countries has been backed by scholars
and policy analysts in the region and abroad,
albeit in varying degrees. This intellectual work
has not only served to document abuses but also
played a crucial role in challenging the
sometimes inaccurate perceptions and
assumptions about the West African security
terrain (Vogt 1993; Vogt and Ekoko 1993). At
times, it has also served to debunk the
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arguments of actors still stuck in the old security
mindset, thus making a case for policy change.
Similarly, such analysts have contributed to
existing literature, for example, on Small Arms
and Light Weapons (SALW) (Aning 2004; Ebo
and Mazal 2003; Musah 2002), youth crisis
(Rashid 2003) and security reform.
The mutual interdependence of local and global
actors and processes is demonstrated by the way
in which regional and global actors have shaped
some of the human security issues of concern to
West African peoples. Some issues have been
given momentum in the last decade by various
external actors and international processes.
Three noteworthy issues include the impact of
armed conflict on children, the proliferation of
small arms and light weapons, and women’s roles
in peace and security. The global advocacy work
of the Office of the UN Special Representative
for Children and Armed Conflict led to
engagement at both the national and regional
levels in West Africa and lent momentum to
advocacy work. International NGOs have
provided support to local groups and, in some
instances, have brought critical issues to the
attention of the UN Security Council through
Arria Formula meetings – a rare opportunity for
direct engagement between non-state actors and
members of the UN Security Council at a venue
outside the Council Chamber.
Similarly, the West African Network on Small
Arms (WAANSA) grew out of a global campaign
against the proliferation of illicit arms, which was
led largely by the International Network on Small
Arms (IANSA). This global campaign in turn
gained momentum as a result of the first global
conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons at
the UN in 2001, generating follow-up
conferences. In the same vein, women’s activism
on peace and security issues in West Africa has
been given added momentum by global processes,
such as the Beijing Conference on Women in
1995, the resulting Platform for Action, and
subsequent follow-up to the Beijing process.
However, despite increased civil society activism,
heroism and outstanding leadership by select
leaders in a number of national contexts, this
has not necessarily translated into extensive civil
society engagement on peace and security at the
subregional level. Only a relatively small group
of West African civil society actors have
sustained the debate and consistently engaged
with subregional actors on relevant issues.
Despite the quantity of those involved in peace
and security work at the subregional level, it has
been possible to stay engaged and make an
impact for several reasons. First, this small
meeting of minds is committed to peace and
security in West Africa and has been operating as
a loose network since the early 1990s. Second,
the civil conflicts and continuing authoritarian
rule in different national settings served to rally
actors around similar issues, thus enabling them
to consolidate and expand their network and
areas of activity.
Several reasons explain the absence of a large civil
society movement at the regional level. First is a
weak knowledge base on peace and security issues.
This is in part the result of a long period of
exclusion of civilians from security discourse under
authoritarian rule. Consequently, the role of civil
society is often limited to activities such as protests
and demonstrations, awareness campaigns and
low-level advocacy work. Only a small number of
civil society actors are able to provide intellectual
leadership and engage with the discourse while
conducting high-level advocacy. There is thus a
tendency for a disconnection between those
engaging policy-practitioners at regional and
global levels and those operating at the frontline
at the local level even if there is a consensus on the
causes being advanced.
Second is a factor which compounds this
disconnection, i.e. the tendency for national
governments to become stumbling blocks to civil
society work, especially when this might reveal a
regime’s governance deficits. A third and related
factor is the absence of a systematic approach
through training and leadership-building for a
new generation of actors in this field. Much of
the response is ad hoc as a result of certain young
scholars and activists operating in isolation.
Although programmes to address this gap are
beginning to emerge, they are still too few to
make a visible impact.
Finally, leadership of the small regional civil
society movement is undergoing a transition.
Many of the earlier generation of civil society
leaders, who founded the organisations that have
been at the forefront of the regional security
debate, have themselves moved on to join
governments or inter-governmental institutions.
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It is still too soon to see what this transition will
mean for the regional work on peace and
security, although it will be difficult to reverse
some of the gains realised, not least because the
now institutionalised engagement of these civil
society leaders with ECOWAS.
4 ECOWAS and civil society interaction
In the fluid immediate post-Cold War
environment, addressing West Africa’s
multifarious security concerns required
innovation, creativity, and even gallantry, among
a range of actors locally and regionally. Crucially,
there was a critical mass of actors, which was
instrumental in shaping the interaction between
civil society and ECOWAS and helped create a
credible formula for dealing with the exigency of
the time.
Three main factors became apparent in civil
society’s effort to bring citizens’ concern with
security beyond immediate locales to national
and regional levels. First, many national
governments were not responsive to these
security concerns, either because they did not
have the capacity to respond or political will was
lacking. Second, it was key officials of the central
ECOWAS bureaucracy, the Commission, who
demonstrated their willingness to work with civil
society. Third, officials of some member states
undergoing democratic transition were more
open to civil society engagement with ECOWAS,
sometimes facilitating civil society’s access to
ECOWAS processes.
Some West African states signed international
conventions and agreements (e.g. on the
protection of children) but failed to honour these
conventions even if they were ratified. Thus,
commitment to the conventions depended on the
goodwill of individual governmental leaders.
Overall, many West African governments
remained unreachable and impenetrable by civil
society, authoritarian approaches being preferred
even when a commitment was made to embark
on democratic change. Although this is
beginning to change, the staging of multi-party
elections does not automatically translate into
improved access to government by civil society.
Interestingly, while many West African
governments were not accessible, civil society
found ECOWAS a valuable entry point on a
range of peace and security issues. At first
glance, this appears contradictory because
ECOWAS is governed by the decisions of Heads
of State and Government; and one can imagine
that leaders who are inaccessible to their
population cannot effectively facilitate public
access to a regional organisation where they are
the key decision-makers. However, West African
states were not all at the same level of
recalcitrance. Some states had progressed
further than others in their democratic
transitions and openness to civil society
engagement. States such as Ghana provided
valuable entry points for regional civil society.
Apart from this, the ECOWAS Commission has
been more open to engagement with a range of
actors, including bilateral and international
agencies.
As ECOWAS developed its normative
framework, its interaction with civil society
became more visible. Since 2003, there has been
a major shift in the nature and level of civil
society and ECOWAS interaction. By then, a
number of civil society organisations, including
WANEP and CDD among others, had become
active in ECOWAS consultations on peace and
security. Gradually, these consultations began to
coalesce into concrete initiatives that built upon
ongoing work on peace and security in the
region. Two events in January 2003 were
significant not only in terms of consolidating civil
society work on peace and security but also in
strengthening ECOWAS–civil society
collaboration.
The first was a meeting of civil society groups to
review the UNDP supported Programme of
Coordination and Assistance on Security and
Development (PCASED), which was established
to backstop the ECOWAS Moratorium on small
arms and light weapons, adopted in 1998. Civil
society gained access to the second event – the
ECOWAS Ministerial meeting – largely with the
support of the then Foreign Minister of Ghana,
Hackman Owusu-Agyeman, who placed the issue
on the agenda. Civil society’s already ongoing
engagement with ECOWAS made it possible to
take the meeting’s recommendations forward.
ECOWAS’s adoption in June 2006 of its
Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, their
Ammunition, and other Associated Material and
the subsequent establishment of a Small Arms
Unit in ECOWAS have been attributed, in part,
to the influence of civil society.
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A relationship that was based on regular
consultations moved rapidly toward
institutionalisation. From 30 May to 1 June 2003,
the ECOWAS Secretariat co-convened a
consultation in Abuja with CDD and
International Alert. This consultation focused on
strengthening the capacity of ECOWAS and
West African civil society on human security.
Participants, including scholars, practitioners,
civil society actors and funding agencies,
analysed West Africa’s human security situation
according to the conditions in states
experiencing conflict or emerging from conflict,
states transitioning to stable democracy or
consolidating democratically and states
confronted with human security challenges. The
consultation emphasised the need for collective
regional response.
The conclusions set a framework for
institutionalising this relationship, which
included, among other things, the establishment
of national and regional monitoring mechanisms
on the status of human security; a review of the
processes of civil society accreditation with
ECOWAS; creation of a civil society unit in
ECOWAS as well as an independent civil society
secretariat to facilitate cooperation between
West African civil society organisations and
ECOWAS; and a West African Peoples’ Assembly
to coincide with the annual Summit of the
Authority of Heads of State and Governments
(ECOWAS, CDD and International Alert 2003).
In order to advance these proposals, an ad hoc
group was established to work with the
ECOWAS Commission, other ECOWAS
institutions, the authorities of designated host-
states for ECOWAS Summit meetings and the
peoples and civil society of West Africa. This
group was given the task of developing
appropriate contacts and partnerships to achieve
these objectives.
The process of institutionalisation has
progressed rapidly since this first meeting,
resulting in the creation of a civil society unit.
The West African Civil Society Forum
(WACSOF) was formed before the end of 2003
and the first Peoples’ Assembly was held prior to
the Summit of Heads of State in December 2003.
Representatives of civil society presented the
outcome of the Assembly to the Heads of State
meeting at that Summit, which has become an
annual occurrence ever since. Unlike the period
before 2000, it is now not unusual for civil society
to be actively involved in ECOWAS initiatives
and activities, including the Mechanism. For
example, support for the ECOWAS Early
Warning System has been developed in
collaboration with WANEP. Similarly, the
recently adopted ECOWAS Conflict Prevention
Framework (ECPF) was developed with both
ECOWAS and civil society expertise. Civil
society is actively involved in the implementation
of the ECPF Plan of Action.
This makes progress achieved so far difficult to
reverse, even as the ECOWAS–civil society
relationship continues to evolve.
Institutionalisation of the ECOWAS and civil
society relationship marks a real shift in the way
ECOWAS does business in addition to improving
the responsiveness to security challenges on the
ground. It will be difficult to alter even if future
leadership in the ECOWAS Commission becomes
less interested in collaborating with civil society.
The present scale of interaction is already
gradually reforming the ways in which West
African leaders engage. Furthermore, it is clear
that external partnerships have played a huge
part in consolidating the ECOWAS–civil society
relationship. Also, bilateral actors and
international NGOs have supported collaboration
through funding or policies. Indeed, such actors
have sometimes relied on the advice of West
African civil society actors in defining the terms
of their own engagement with ECOWAS.
How can we best explain this rapid move toward
institutionalisation of the ECOWAS–civil society
interactions? The ECOWAS Mechanism and the
subsequent restructuring of the Commission,
which implies engagement with non-
governmental actors for an Early Warning
System, offers one logical explanation. The
requisite expertise for the analysis of particular
security issues in the region resides within civil
society. Thus it was inevitable that ECOWAS
would need to rely on such expertise for the
successful implementation of the Mechanism’s
provisions given the shortage of human resource
capacity in the Commission. However, this might
not have brought about considerable change in
the way ECOWAS interacted with civil society
because ECOWAS could have simply continued
with an ad hoc arrangement, seeking expert
support from civil society on a case-by-case basis.
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What transformed this relationship was the
meeting of minds among leaders from the
Commission and a group of security analysts and
advocates within civil society. The inclination of
the ECOWAS Executive Secretary (now President
of the ECOWAS Commission), Dr Ibn Chambas,
to engage with activists and analysts on the core
security and development issues of concern was
crucial. The former Deputy Executive Secretary
for Political Affairs, Defence and Security, the late
General Cheihk Oumar Diarra, was similarly
inclined. It was therefore not difficult for civil
society actors to gain access to ECOWAS. Most
significantly, these developments coincided with
Chambas’s own strategic objective to form a
closer working relationship between ECOWAS
and civil society. Thus there was an open door at
the highest level in the ECOWAS Commission for
civil society engagement.
However, many challenges lie ahead for this new,
evolving relationship. First, openness at the
highest level in the ECOWAS Commission may
not always be present, particularly after the
expiry of the term of office of the present
leadership. Second, even now, there is potential
for friction as ECOWAS officials tend to see West
African civil society through WACSOF, as natural
allies, and expects that both will assume the
same line of action on major political and security
developments. In reality, they may sometimes
disagree on approaches towards subregional or
continental concerns (e.g. Zimbabwe).
Third, the still evolving civil society movement
on peace and security faces the challenge of
sustainability. Many of the movement’s original
leaders have transitioned into other roles in
government or international organisations. It is
too soon to see whether and how the next
generation of leaders will advance their cause.
Furthermore, the knowledge base on peace and
security in the subregion remains weak, and
much will depend on the degree to which it is
strengthened by future West African scholars,
policy analysts and activists.
Finally, the nature of civil society leadership will
determine the degree to which external actors
hijack the security agenda in the subregion.
While Western donor countries and agencies
continue to support the ECOWAS peace and
security architecture, they remain uncoordinated
in this approach with each sometimes promoting
their own individual agendas. Only clarity of
vision within ECOWAS and a dynamic civil
society can curtail this tendency in the long run.
5 Conclusion
The same historical process that compelled
ECOWAS to alter its course also opened up
space for civil society activism and an emerging
movement in the field of peace and security. The
interaction between ECOWAS and West African
civil society on issues of peace and security has
no doubt been mutually beneficial. ECOWAS has
expanded its terrain of activity and its
knowledge base, and civil society has
consolidated its work while successfully placing
some of its security concerns on the agenda of
the organisation. Together, both sides have been
able to collaborate on an approach to security,
which is moving the region from its exclusive
focus on state security, to the security needs of its
peoples. However, this relationship continues to
evolve and will require sustained engagement in
order to ensure an effective response to regional
security challenges.
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Notes
1 This article relies heavily on my observation of
and direct participation in the process of
crafting a West African civil society–ECOWAS
agenda in response to the human security
challenges in West Africa.
2 ECOWAS had adopted the Protocol on Non-
Aggression in 1978, which focused on peaceful
management of conflict between states. And
in 1981, it adopted the Protocol on Mutual
Assistance in Defence to address threats from
outside the region.
4Olonisakin40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:39  Page 111
References
Amnesty International (2008) Gambia: Fear
Rules, London: Amnesty International
Aning, Kwesi (2004) ‘Moratorium on Small Arms
and Light Weapons’, African Security Review 13.3
Ebo, Adedeji and Mazal, Laura (2003) Small Arms
Control in West Africa, London: International Alert
ECOWAS, CDD and International Alert (2003)
Communique of the First ECOWAS Civil Society
Consultation, Abuja CDD, 1 June
ECOWAS (2001) Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance, Dakar: ECOWAS, 21 December
ECOWAS (1999) Protocol Relating to the Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security, Lomé: ECOWAS,
10 December
ECOWAS (1993) Revised Treaty, Cotonou:
ECOWAS, 24 July
Musah, Abdel-Fatau (2002) ‘Small Arms, A Time
Bomb Under West Africa’s Democratizing
Process’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring
Olonisakin, ’Funmi (2007) ‘Pan African
Approaches to Civilian Control and
Democratic Governance’, in Victor-Yves
Ghebali and Alexander Lambert (eds),
Democratic Governance of the Security Sector Beyond
the OSCE Area, Berlin: Lit Verlag
Olonisakin, ’Funmi (2003) ‘ECOMOG Forces in
Sierra Leone’, in Ibrahim Abdullah (ed.),
Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone
Civil War, Dakar: CODESRIA
Rashid, Ismail (2003) ‘Student Radicals, Lumpen
Youth, and the Origins of the Revolutionary
Groups in Sierra Leone, 1977–1996’, in
Abdullah Ibrahim (ed.), Between Democracy and
Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War, Dakar:
Council for the Development of Social Science
Research in Africa (CODESRIA)
Vogt, Margaret (1993) The Liberian Crisis and
ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional
Peacekeeping, Lagos: Gabumo
Vogt, Margaret and Ekoko, A.E. (eds) (1993)
Nigeria in International Peacekeeping 1960–1992,
Lagos and Oxford: Malthouse Press
Olonisakin ECOWAS and Civil Society Movements in West Africa112
4Olonisakin40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:39  Page 112
